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Re-setting the Eastern Partnership in Moldova 
Nicu Popescu 
 
ecent political changes in Moldova offer a 
window of opportunity for both EU-Moldova 
relations and for the Eastern Partnership. In 
the next few months, the EU should move quickly to 
consolidate the reform process in Moldova. In 
particular, the EU should send a group of high-level 
EU policy advisors to the country for the purpose of 
promoting reform of law-enforcement agencies. 
Leaders from the EU and its member states should 
also undertake a series of high-profile visits to 
Moldova to demonstrate support for reforms and 
European integration. Finally, the EU should support 
visible projects that have a quick policy impact, and 
will have broader relevance for Moldova’s 
modernisation. Such projects could include equipping 
the entire country with free wireless internet access, 
the liberalisation of air travel between the EU and 
Moldova, replacing the corrupt traffic police with 
speed cameras and traffic patrols and moving forward 
on liberalising visas for Moldovans.  
Introduction 
The EU has become accustomed to hearing almost 
exclusively bad news from the Eastern 
neighbourhood. Consolidating authoritarianism, post-
electoral unrest, the failing hopes of the ‘colour 
revolutions’, gas cut-offs and even wars have severely 
undermined the effectiveness of the EU’s policies in 
the region. Worse, such instabilities have caused a 
‘neighbourhood fatigue’ in the EU. The messy politics 
of the Eastern neighbourhood has had a disheartening 
effect on the EU’s neighbourhood policy. At the 
launch of the Eastern Partnership Summit in May 
2010, most leaders of big EU member states did not 
even bother to show up. Expectations of the Eastern 
Partnership are minimal. 
Against such a background, Moldova was among the 
least likely sources of good news. The country has had 
its fair share of instabilities: it was governed for eight 
years by a corrupt and semi-autocratic communist 
government, which came to power through free and 
fair elections in 2001; it is the poorest state in Europe 
with a high share of rural population; and it has an 
unsolved secessionist conflict in Transnistria. Yet, 
Moldova seems to emerge as the source of the best 
political news from the region in recent years for the 
sheer fact that it managed to change a government 
through elections. Recent elections brought to power a 
four-party Alliance for European Integration, making 
Moldova the only post-Soviet state (the Baltics aside) 
in the last ten years where the transfer of power took 
place via elections. Moreover, Moldova is now the 
only CIS state where every single transition of power 
has taken place following elections, rather than via 
staged successions, street protests and colour 
revolution or palace coups.
1  
The political change in Moldova is an opportunity for 
the EU to re-launch its policies in the East. Moldova 
is a fragile state, but it is also the most amenable to 
EU influence. When it comes to trade, its dependence 
on the EU is greater than that of any other post-Soviet 
state and its support for European integration is also 
                                                      
1 The changes of presidents in Azerbaijan (2003), Russia 
(2000 and 2008) and Armenia (2008) came as staged 
successions; the changes of presidents in Georgia (2003), 
Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) came as a result of 
street protests and ‘colour revolution’; the change of 
presidents in Turkmenistan came as a result of the death of 
the previous life-time president; and Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Belarus (after 1994) and Tajikistan (after the 
civil war) have adopted a ‘no-transfer-of power’ model of 
quasi-lifetime presidency. It is likely, however, that 
Ukraine will change president through free and fair 
elections in January 2010.  
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the highest in the region. It also shares a language and 
a history with Romania (an EU member state), and 
due to migration flows and geography, it has the 
highest intensity of people-to-people interaction with 
the EU compared to the other former Soviet states.  
If EU leaders are looking for ways to make the 
Eastern Partnership successful, there are worse places 
to start than Moldova. The country could serve as a 
laboratory for a different sort of European 
neighbourhood policy – a partnership that is more 
effective, more attuned to local needs and that gives 
palpable benefits for both the EU and its partners. 
Certainly, a successful EU policy on Moldova will not 
on its own transform the entire neighbourhood, but it 
could be a template for a more effective EU policy 
towards other post-Soviet states like Georgia, 
Armenia or Ukraine.  
Moldova’s electoral change 
The last six months have been the worst in Moldova’s 
short history since its 1992 war with Transnistria. The 
deep economic crisis hit Chisinau hard, leaving a huge 
budget deficit and a sharp drop in remittances and 
exports. But this was overshadowed by an even-
deeper political crisis. Two days after parliamentary 
elections on 5 April 2008, some 20,000 people took 
the streets of the capital to protest alleged electoral 
fraud by the then-ruling Communist Party. The 
protests quickly degenerated into looting, which led to 
a severe crackdown by the government, including 
mass arrests and beatings and the death of at least one 
person in police custody.
2 The crisis highlighted just 
how problematic the rule of law in Moldova is and 
how politicised and undemocratic the law 
enforcement agencies had become. The crackdown 
led to a huge polarisation of society which made it 
impossible for the 60 MPs from the Communist Party 
to persuade even one single opposition MP to vote for 
their candidate for president who must be elected by 
61 votes out of 101. Failure to elect a president led to 
the dissolution of parliament and early elections on 29 
July.  
The July elections brought a narrow but surprising 
victory for the opposition. The Communists obtained 
48 seats in the parliament, and the opposition 53. The 
surprise was due to the defection from the Communist 
party of Marian Lupu who took over a previously 
marginal party and obtained 13 seats. Credit is also 
due to the Communists for the fact that despite some 
allegations of fraud and a rather unfair electoral 
campaign, the Communist Party never resorted to the 
massive scale of vote-rigging associated with most 
                                                      
2 See George Dura and Elena Gnedina,  Moldova’s 
‘wannabe democracy’ is worth rescuing, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 185, April 2009. 
post-Soviet governments. For example during the 
presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004, ‘voter 
turnout’ in some regions such as Luhansk was as 
much as 119%.  
The Alliance for European Integration 
Four Moldovan (former) opposition parties have 
created a governing Alliance for European 
Integration. None of its leaders is the type of 
charismatic revolutionary that swept to power during 
the colour revolutions in the region. The Alliance’s 
leaders are mostly dull technocrats. But this might 
also be a positive factor in a society that is divided 
and needs systematic reforms rather than 
revolutionary projects. Vlad Filat, the leader of the 
Liberal-Democratic Party, was selected as prime 
minister, and the leader of the Democratic Party 
Marian Lupu is the coalition’s candidate for President. 
The Alliance will still need at least eight votes from 
the Communists in order to elect the presidency. 
Failure to obtain those votes will lead to early 
elections, most probably in autumn 2010.  
The priorities of the coalition are the dismantling of 
the Putin-style ‘power vertical’ (i.e. personalised 
rule), strengthening of the rule of law, real 
implementation (as opposed to ‘declarative 
implementation’) of Moldova’s commitment vis-à-vis 
the EU and forming strategic partnerships with 
Moldova’s two neighbours Romania and Ukraine, as 
well as with Russia and the US. On the conflict in 
Transnistria, the Alliance is likely to de-prioritise the 
conflict-settlement process. Instead of frantically 
looking for a quick fix to the conflict as the previous 
administration did, the Alliance is likely to focus on a 
mid-term agenda of strengthening Moldova’s 
economic attractiveness for the residents of 
Transnistria, while promoting joint projects de facto 
reintegrating the two banks of the Nistru River. 
As the economic crisis hits Moldova, the immediate 
survival of the coalition depends on quick external 
financial assistance from the IMF, EU, US and 
Russia. Agreements with all of these external partners 
are under discussion. The US approved a $262 million 
assistance package that will go into roads and 
irrigation. The IMF agreed to lend Moldova $588 
million, which also opens the way for some EU 
assistance. Surprisingly, China also promised $1 
billion in assistance. In the medium-term, however, 
the success of the coalition will depend on its capacity 
to promote domestic reform, to bring Moldova closer 
to the EU and to provide tangible benefits from these 
reforms.  
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Internally divided rivals  
The future presents ample opportunities for greater 
instability in Moldova. Both the Alliance for 
European Integration and the Communists have 
underlying potential fissures. The Alliance is a motley 
crew of centre-right and centre-left parties and future 
tensions between them are unavoidable. However, the 
bigger question is whether these tensions will paralyse 
the country’s modernisation in the same way that 
disagreements between the former allies Viktor 
Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko have paralysed 
Ukraine since the Orange Revolution. The alternative 
scenario is for Moldova to embark on a more ‘Central 
European’ path where creative tensions open up the 
political system, create checks and balances and make 
reforms possible. Political instability per se is not 
necessarily bad, as long as reforms are implemented. 
For example, between 1994 and 2004, Latvia had 10 
prime ministers, while Estonia had 7 and the country’s 
success depends on real reforms, rather than apparent 
political instability. With some luck and external 
assistance, Moldova could avoid the fate of Ukraine’s 
Orange coalition. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is likely 
to be more amenable to EU influence, easier to fix, 
and the risk of the Communists returning to power too 
great to allow the coalition too much room for 
complacency. 
The Communist Party remains the biggest party in the 
parliament. Its leader – Vladimir Voronin is both the 
source of its strength and the party’s greatest problem. 
Voronin created this party, brought it to power, held it 
together for a decade and a half, but is now unable to 
let it go. Instead of resigning after losing the July 
elections, he is trying to hang on. Just like the new 
government, Voronin’s party has potential fault lines 
between an ‘old guard’ and a ‘young guard’. 
Paradoxically, it is the latter – some Communist MPs 
are under 30 and their informal leader Mark Tcaciuc 
is in his early 40s – that is the more intransigent: they 
need Voronin for another one-to-two years to 
strengthen their position in the party against the older 
generation. The older guard is highly diverse, but 
many of them might prefer a deal with the new 
government – voting for a new president in exchange 
for some (political, economic and personal) 
guarantees. Despite such divisions, the chances for 
new early elections next year are high. Many 
Communists think that if they don’t vote for a new 
president in the coming few weeks and thereby 
provoking early elections next year, they might return 
to power since the population will blame the effects of 
the economic crisis on the new government.  
The new government, however, believes that the 
Communists will gain even fewer votes in the event of 
early elections since they will not control the state 
apparatus, the state media or the patronage networks 
that come with incumbency. This would especially be 
the case if the government moves quickly closer to the 
EU not least by initiating a dialogue on visa 
liberalisation and receiving the promised external 
assistance from the IMF, the US, the EU and Russia, 
which would enable it to unwind the crisis. After 
almost a year of electioneering and political battles, 
the country desperately needs a stable government 
able to steer the country through the crisis. 
Russia’s pragmatism  
The electoral changes in Moldova led to a drastic U-
turn in Russia’s approach to Moldova. Until the July 
elections, Russia openly and actively supported the 
Communist Party. Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir 
Putin held a series of well-publicised summits with 
the then president Voronin ahead of the April and July 
elections. During the April riots, Russia gave high-
level diplomatic support to the Communist Party and 
even supplied riot-control gear. In late June, Putin also 
promised Vladimir Voronin a $500 million credit line 
which was widely used for PR purposes by the 
Communists in the election campaign.  
But soon after the Communists lost the elections, 
Russia’s unequivocal support for the party quickly 
evaporated. A couple of weeks after the elections, 
President Medvedev argued that Russia wanted a 
partnership with any Moldovan government 
irrespective of whether it was Communist or not. 
Then a few Russian emissaries travelled to Chisinau 
(including the head of the Russian Presidential 
Administration, Sergey Naryshkin) to test the new 
coalition’s views on Russia and to decide whether to 
engage early on. When the coalition partners 
reiterated they are not likely to force Moldova’s way 
into NATO and out of the CIS, Russia reiterated its 
readiness to discuss the half a billion dollar credit line 
with the new government as well. Russia clearly 
avoided the mistake it made during the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine when it stubbornly supported 
the losing Viktor Yanukovich. Russia’s pragmatism 
culminated with a visit by President Mevedev to 
Moldova for a CIS summit held in Chisinau where 
Medvedev met not only the acting President of 
Moldova Mihai Ghimpu, but also the Alliance’s 
candidate for the presidency Marian Lupu in a clear 
show of support for his bid. Medvedev also refused to 
meet Vladimir Voronin which dealt a huge blow to 
the Communist Party, which had campaigned as the 
most Russia-friendly political force in Moldova.  
The EU’s window of opportunity  
The European neighbourhood policy has been 
severely short of recent successes. The EU avoided 
playing a meaningful role in the Caucasus conflicts 
until the August 2008 war; it could do little to offset 4 | Nicu Popescu 
the effects of Russian pressures on many CIS states 
ranging from blockades to gas cut-offs; and the vast 
sums of money spent by the EU in the neighbourhood 
have often made little difference because local 
governments were not receptive to EU advice and EU 
funding often went to direct budgetary support, rather 
than to visible projects on the ground which would 
gain the visibility for the EU.  
Because the Voronin government was not interested 
in democratisation, Moldova ended up in quasi-
isolation with only a handful of foreign dignitaries 
ever visiting the country and the EU only reluctantly 
cooperating with Moldova. The Alliance for European 
Integration represents a window of opportunity for EU 
policy vis-à-vis Moldova. The forthcoming years will 
undoubtedly experience political setbacks, tensions 
and disappointments, but compared with the situation 
in virtually all the other Eastern neighbourhood states, 
the EU has the power and Moldova has the interest in 
intensifying rapid EU-Moldova cooperation. Moldova 
could become the one success story of the Eastern 
Partnership.  
An EU policy package for Moldova  
The EU should move fast in the coming months to 
solidify and consolidate the reform process in 
Moldova. It should show a higher level of political 
engagement than before, and it should spend the EU 
assistance on a few visible projects that will gain the 
EU traction with the population, while having a 
transformative effect on Moldova. Positive 
developments in Moldova will also have a beneficial 
effect on conflict-resolution in Transnistria which 
should benefit, wherever possible, from being 
included in EU assistance projects. The EU should 
consider the following actions: 
•  Sending a group of high-level policy advisors on 
reforms, with a special emphasis on rule of law. 
The EU already deploys an eight-person high-level 
advisory group in Armenia, which will be 
supplemented with another six advisors soon. In 
the case of Moldova such a mission should 
comprise some 15-20 EU advisors in the 
presidential office, parliament and governmental 
secretariats, ministries of economy, agriculture, 
justice, interior, the office of the ombudsman and 
the intelligence service.  
•  International donors could set-up a fund to 
consolidate the administrative capacity of the new 
government by launching a ‘Capacity-Building for 
Reform in Periods of Transition’ programme. Such 
projects have been supported by the international 
community in over 20 states, including Albania, 
Serbia (after the fall of Milosevic) and Georgia 
(after the Rose Revolution). The fund would 
provide salary top-ups to high-level officials in 
priority reform sectors, making it possible to attract 
good specialists (i.e. Moldovans currently working 
for better-paid jobs in NGOs, foreign embassies or 
abroad) to work for the government. This might be 
a better and more sustainable investment than 
short-term external advisors that often come and 
go. Possible donors for such a fund would include 
the UNDP, USAID, IOM, OSI, EU member states 
and perhaps the European Commission.  
The EU should offer support in a much more visible 
way. In addition to implementing structural reforms 
with long-term impact, the EU will also need to focus 
on a few visible projects with quick policy impact that 
will have broader relevance for the country’s 
modernisation. The idea is to identify sectors that can 
be reformed relatively quickly and will have a visible 
short-term impact with long-term implications. The 
following ideas could be considered: 
•  Cover the entire country with wireless internet 
(Macedonia, which is roughly the same size as 
Moldova, was equipped with wireless internet a 
few years ago with financial support from USAID. 
The project started as an attempt to provide all the 
schools with internet and cost approximately $4 
million). Covering the entire country with wireless 
internet will also have positive side effects, such as 
providing internet access to all the schools and 
municipalities, improving access to information 
and strengthening pluralism of the media and 
making Moldova potentially more attractive to 
foreign investors (in conjunction with other 
measures). In Macedonia all the schools and 
municipalities have free internet access, while 
ordinary users pay for it. The project was 
implemented by a commercial company and 
boosted internet literacy.  
•  The EU and Moldova should liberalise air travel, 
hopefully leading to a drastic reduction of air travel 
fares to and from Moldova. Moldova’s neighbours, 
Ukraine and Romania, have more liberalised air 
travel markets, which makes the costs of air travel 
from Moldova to other European capitals up to two 
to three times more expensive than from Kiev or 
Bucharest. Reducing air travel costs through an 
injunction of competition into the air transportation 
market will first and foremost benefit the 
Moldovan diaspora and their relatives who would 
be able to travel more often and cheaper. It could 
also attract more foreign visitors, both potential 
investors and tourists. It will also integrate 
Moldova more strongly into the European 
transportation networks. 
•  The government should gradually replace the 
corrupt traffic police with speed cameras and 
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start up funds to install speed cameras, this could 
be done through a private-public partnership where 
a foreign private company that has the know-how 
would install the cameras and organise the logistics 
of collecting fines in exchange for a share of the 
money obtained from the collection of fines.  
•  Most importantly the EU will have to move on 
liberalising visas for Moldova. Currently, Russia 
and Ukraine have visa liberalisation dialogues with 
the EU, but a handful of EU member states is 
blocking a similar approach to Moldova. This 
misses the point. In 2008, Russian citizens 
received some 8 million EU visas, Ukraine roughly 
1 million EU visas, while Moldovans were issued a 
mere 20,000 Schengen visas and 16,000 Bulgarian 
visas. Even if one adds Romanian visas to the list, 
this will still be less than 1% of the number of 
visas issued  to Russians  and  Ukrainians in a year.  
To offer Moldova what is already on offer to 
Ukraine and Russia would make no difference to 
the EU but a huge difference for Moldova, not 
least in inducing the residents of its secessionist 
region of Transnistria, which is already flush with 
Russian and Ukrainian passports, to reintegrate 
with Moldova. So far, the EU’s restrictive visa 
policies are the biggest incentive for Moldovans 
to seek other citizenships – whether Romanian or 
Russian. In the short term, the EU should consider 
the abolition of visa fees and extend the 
provisions of the existing visa-facilitation 
agreement with Moldova. However, the EU and 
Moldova need to agree on a roadmap for visa-free 
travel.  
The following one-to-two years will be an important 
window of opportunity for the EU and the Moldovan 
government to set the pace for reforms, to modernise 
Moldova and ultimately stabilise the EU’s immediate 
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